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The War in Iraq: Should We Have Expected Better Forecasts?
Abstract
Iraq continues to be in the news and confronts us with important questions about the predictability of
decisions people make in conflict situations. For some, the plan to invade Iraq was based on poor forecasts
about how troops would be received: reasonable people would not have made optimistic forecasts. Others,
however, assert that it is hindsight bias that makes the prognosis so clear.
Comments
Reprinted from Foresight: The International Journal of Applied Forecasting, Issue 2, October 2005, pages 50-52.
Publisher URL: http://ideas.repec.org/s/for/ijafaa.html Permission granted by publisher to author.
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/47
THE WAR IN IRAQ: SHOULD WE HAVE EXPECTED BETTER FORECASTS?
by Kesten C. Green and J. Scott Armstrong
Kesten Green is a Senior Research Fellow of the Business and Economic Forecasting Unit, Monash Univer-
sity and Managing Director of Decision Research Ltd. He has published in the International Journal of
Forecasting and presented papers at many international symposia. In recent years, he has been research-
ing the problem of how best to predict the decisions people will make in conflict situations. Prior to his
academic career, Kesten spent more than twenty years in business as a founder of four companies.
FORECASTING FAQS
J. Scott Armstrong is Professor of Marketing at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. He is a
founder of the Journal of Forecasting, the International Journal of Forecasting, and the International
Symposium on Forecasting. He is the creator of the Forecasting Principles website,
(forecastingprinciples.com) and editor of Principles of Forecasting: A Handbook for Researchers and
Practitioners. He is one of the first six Honorary Fellows of the International Institute of Forecasters, and
was named Society for Marketing Advances/JAI Press Distinguished Marketing Scholar for 2000.
Iraq continues to be in the news and confronts us with
important questions about the predictability of decisions
people make in conflict situations. To some, the plan to
invade Iraq was based on poor forecasts about how troops
would be received: reasonable people would not have made
optimistic forecasts. Others, however, assert that it is
hindsight bias that makes the prognosis so clear.
Which is correct?
To address whether decisions in
conflicts can be accurately predicted, we
conducted experiments. We prepared
descriptions of eight actual conflict
situations and disguised them. For
example, in one situation “Midistan”
(in reality, Syria), built a dam on the
river that supplied water to another
country “Deltaland” (which was Iraq).
Deltaland massed its troops on the
border and threatened to destroy the
dam. Other than the disguised names,
the information provided to the subjects
accurately described real situations.
While we have been unable to determine which forecasting
methods were used for the current war in Iraq, forecasts in
such situations are typically made by experts without the
help of formal forecasting procedures. So we asked subjects
to use their judgment to predict what decision would be
made in each of our situations (Green, 2005). For example,
in the Midistan-Deltaland conflict, there were decision
options to bomb the dam, release additional water, or
declare war. Typically, there were three or four feasible
decisions from which to choose. If our
subjects merely guessed the actual
decision for each of the eight conflicts,
they would have predicted accurately 28
percent of the time.
When we used university students, their
forecasts were accurate for only 31
percent of their 354 predictions, which
was little better than chance. This
suggests that decisions made in conflict
situations are not obvious to reasonable
people.
We then examined the results when we
asked experts, rather than students, to
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make predictions. We gave experts conflicts that matched
their expertise. Only 31 percent of 101 forecasts by game
theory experts and 32 percent of 106 forecasts by other
experts (Green and Armstrong, 2004) were accurate. In
short, given correct information, experts were no better
than students in forecasting decisions made in conflict
situations. Based on these findings, one cannot look at the
results of the Iraq invasion and conclude that it would have
been easy to forecast the events that have unfolded. Those
who claim otherwise are suffering from hindsight bias.
Our research has shown, however, that effective methods
are available to forecast decisions in conflict situations.
One method, which we call structured analogies, involves
instructing experts to describe situations that are analogous
to a target situation. The experts also rate the similarity of
each analogy to the target situation, and match the
outcomes in their analogies to potential target-situation
outcomes. For example, if the target is the current situation
in Iraq, the analogy of the Vietnam War implies troops
will be withdrawn due to domestic pressure, whereas the
analogy of Jefferson and the Barbary pirates implies
eventual success after initial setbacks. Experts are asked
to compare each of their analogies with the target and list
similarities and differences before assigning scores for
overall similarity.
 The outcome of an expert’s top-rated analogy is used as
the forecast. In our study, structured analogies led to 46
percent correct predictions (based on 97 predictions made
for our eight situations). These forecasts represented a
substantial improvement compared to the 32 percent for
unaided experts.
For structured analogies to be useful, experts must be able
to identify analogies. An alternative procedure, which we
call simulated interaction, does not have this restriction.
It involves giving people roles and a description of the
target situation before leaving them to interact.
Thus, leaders of Midistan would meet with leaders
of Deltaland. We were unable to obtain experts for
this part of our research, so we used university
students. For example, some of our participants
were female students in their teens and early-20s
playing the roles of middle-aged male political
leaders in the Midistan-Deltaland situation. The
interactions typically took less than an hour.
When we have described our study to experts
(without telling them the results), they have had no
expectation that simulated interactions by students would
improve accuracy. We were amazed by the results:
simulated-interaction forecasts were correct for 62 percent
of the 105 forecasts made by these groups. Combining
improves accuracy (Armstrong, 2001). There were ten or
more simulated-interaction forecasts for each conflict, and
we found that the modal forecasts were accurate for seven
(88 percent) of the eight conflicts.
The findings show that it is not sufficient to obtain the
accurate information. It is also important to use formal
forecasting methods that are based on empirical
comparisons of reasonable methods.
While our research provides the only scientific tests of
structured analogies and simulated interaction, variations
of the latter method have been used in practice on a few
occasions. Perhaps the most notable application was
President Reagan’s participation in simulated interactions
prior to meetings with President Gorbachev in Geneva and
Reykjavik (Matlock, 2004). These allowed Reagan to assess
how Gorbachev would respond to different approaches and
these meetings went well for both parties. In a more recent
example, the New York Times reported that John Kerry
simulated his first debate
with George Bush on
September 30, 2004,
whereas Bush merely
talked through his possible
replies (Wilgoren and
Stevenson, 2004). Polls
indicated that Kerry won
the debate in the eyes of
the viewers.
Organizations must often
deal with conflict
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situations. Like generals and diplomats, business managers
who face situations such as corporate-takeover battles,
hostile competition, and labor negotiations are likely to
benefit from improved forecasts of the decisions adversaries
will make.
Information on conflict-forecasting methods and copies
of the papers we refer to are available at
www.conflictforecasting.com
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